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Abstract
Can intuition be reduced to belief? That an agent who intuits that p
sometimes believes that p is false is often thought to demonstrate that
it cannot. I show that this case is inconclusive, but also that a rigor-
ous argument for the same conclusion can be rebuilt using the notion
of rational criticisability. Reductionist accounts entail that agents are
rationally criticisable in cases when we know they are not. They are
therefore untenable. Interestingly, the considerations that show this
are are precisely parallel to those that show that attempts to reduce
perception to belief fail. Using the notion of rational criticisability I
show that an intuition that p is also not reducible to the acquisition
of a belief that p, to a credence in p, or to the acquisition of a credence
in p. Most significantly, however, we can also show that neither in-
tuition nor perception is reducible to a belief that q, for any q. This,
I argue, strongly suggests a lesson about the nature of intuition and
perception. Intuition and perception are experiences.
1 Introduction
What is an intuition? Some say that intuition is an irreducible proposi-
tional attitude (Bealer 1998; Pust 2000); others that intuition can be re-
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duced to some already-familiar mental phenomenon (Earlenbaugh and
Molyneux 2009; Lewis 1983; Sosa 1998; van Inwagen 1997; Williamson
2004, 2007). I argue that intuition is not reducible to a doxastic propo-
sitional attitude. That is not a new conclusion: certain stock examples
are widely taken to establish it. I show, however, that the standard case
against the reduction is inconclusive; the proponent has a straightforward
answer (§4).
I present a new argument against the reduction of intuition to belief
(§5). The proposed reduction entails that agents are rationally criticisable
in situations where we know they are not. It is therefore untenable. In-
terestingly, the considerations that show this are are precisely parallel to
those that show that attempts to reduce perception to belief fail. In §6 I
discuss this parallel.
One might have thought that an intuition that p is instead reducible to
a credence in p, or to a different belief, a belief that q. In §7 I show that an
intuition cannot be reduced to a credence. In §8 I show that the argument
I have presented is effective against proposed reductions of an intuition
that p to a belief that q, for any q.
That agents are not rationally criticisable in the relevant situations is
independently interesting. It is also important, because it begins to shed a
light on the true nature of intuition and perception. In the final section of
the paper I discuss the significance of the argument I have presented for
our understanding of the nature of intuition (§9).
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I begin by considering how one might be motivated to attempt a reduc-
tion, and how a a taxonomy of different reductive views might be given.
2 Motivation
What might motivate one to give a reductive account of intuition or per-
ception? When theorising about intuition and perception, an important
datum is that both are putative input-mechanisms. Both perception and
intuition seem to deliver data for the cognitive system to process. A full
theory of the phenomena must tell us whether they really do provide us
with data, but one can hardly deny that they seem to.
Non-veridical intuition and non-veridical perception present struc-
turally analogous challenges to the theories of intuition and perception.
How can perception, given that it is fallible, yield knowledge of a world
independent of and external to the perceiver? How can intuition, given
its fallibility, yield knowledge of truths independent of and external to the
intuiter?1
Fallibility does not warrant wholesale distrust in a putative input-
mechanism. But it does exclude a certain very simple model of the nature
of perception and intuition, namely that on which intuition and perception
simply consists in the ‘grasp of’ a mind-independent reality (where ‘grasp’
1Of course, not everyone agrees that we gain such knowledge through intuition, and
the sceptic denies this even for perception. I am not here arguing that we do gain knowl-
edge in these ways, but explaining how views of the metaphysics of perception and in-
tuition can be seen as interrelated.
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is understood factually). Because it is sometimes non-veridical perception
cannot simply consist in the grasp of independent reality: sometimes there
must be perception without such a grasp. Because intuition is sometimes
non-veridical it cannot simply consist in the grasp of independent truths:
sometimes there must be intuition without such a grasp. The relation to
reality cannot be simple and direct in either case. The challenge is to cor-
rectly account for the complications.2
A natural first reaction is to reject factuality, and say that intuition and
perception both are acquisitions of beliefs, true or false, about reality. This
constitutes a source of motivation for reduction to belief; this is the most
conservative reaction to non-veridical intuition and perception.
A second source of motivation stems from the following considera-
tions. Suppose someone suggested a new mental kind, a propositional
attitude that had, it was claimed, so far been overlooked. I would be rea-
sonable to request a demonstration that the new kind plays a role in a
psychological or philosophical theory that cannot be played by already
acknowledged entities, singly or in combination. Absent this, one would
seem justified in denying that the putative new entity were real.3
2I am not suggesting that either relation should be understood as being indirect: I do
not mean to imply that an intermediary object should be postulated. George Bealer (1998)
argues that what he terms the ‘local’ fallibility of intuition is no bar to the hypothesis
that it is strongly modally tied to truth. The tie holds in rather special circumstances,
however: “Human beings only approximate the relevant cognitive conditions, and they
do this only by working collectively over historical time” (202).
3Note that this is not a point about burden of proof; it would be equally reasonable
to to react by attempting to demonstrate how already acknowledged entities, singly or
in combination, could play the theoretical role claimed for the newcomer. Perhaps the
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Belief and desire are propositional attitudes that strike many as having
passed such a test. They both seem integral to folk-psychological expla-
nation and prediction, and folk-psychology seems to be a very successful
theory.4
Belief and desire also stand out by being ‘pure’ exemplars of opposite
directions of fit. A belief is ‘successful’ if it fits the world, a desire if the
world comes to fit it. Other propositional attitudes do not seem to be ‘pure’
in this way: a fear is actualised if the world comes to fit it but well founded
if it fits the world; hope is realised if the world comes to fit it, but realistic if
it fits the world.
Because belief and desire have already earned their keep, and because
they seem to display pure directions of fit, one might be tempted to think
that other propositional attitudes are reducible to some mix of the two—or
at least that such reductions are well worth a shot. A fear that an avalanche
will strike might be a mixture of some degree of belief that it will combined
with a desire that it do not. A hope that stocks will rise might be a mixture
of some degree of belief that they will combined with a desire that they
do. This is one source of motivation for a reductive account of perception
or intuition. Since no role for desire seems to present itself, reduction to a
new kind could earn its keep by simplifying the overall theory without strictly speaking
playing a role that was not played before. We can safely ignore these complications here.
4Although I find it persuasive my purpose here is not to support this line of reasoning,
but merely to explain a possible source of motivation for a reductive accouint. For oppos-
ing views regarding folk-psychology, see e.g. Churchland (1981). Kim Sterelny (2003) is
one of many who argues that belief has earned its keep in this way, but is more doubtful
about preferences.
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doxastic attitude is the natural choice.
A third source of motivation stems from epistemic concerns. Noting
that intuition is a putative input mechanism—that it appears to provide
data for the cognitive system—one might be motivated to see whether
there is a tenable view which preserves these appearances.5 Or one
might think that intuition is used as evidence in philosophy, and wonder
whether an account can be given that validates such use.6 But if intuition
is irreducible, it is not mysterious how having an intuition could provide
data for the cognitive system, or how it function as evidence? We might
have had a random belief generator in our heads. Why should we think
that intuition is any better? In contrast, if intuition could be reduced it
might seem that these questions were more tractable; whatever story was
given for how the reducing phenomenon provides justification would ap-
ply to intuition as well.7
Finally, a doxastic account of intuition might also be motivated by
5Jim Pryor is motivated by similar considerations for the use of perception in daily life
in his “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist” (Pryor 2000, 538).
6For arguments that intuitions are used as evidence in philosophy, see e.g. Pust (2000,
Chapter 1) and Goldman and Pust (1998). Bealer (1998) argues that intuitions are part of
our ‘standard justificatory procedure’. He has been interpreted by some as referring to
philosophers’ use of intuition (Earlenbaugh and Molyneux 2009, 91). I think Bealer intends
to claim that the use of intuition as evidence is part of a justificatory procedure that is
standard in a wider sense; in the sense of normal human life and inquiry. We need not
pursue this here, however. For an argument that intuition is not used as evidence in
philosophy, see Earlenbaugh and Molyneux (2009).
7Timothy Williamson is clearly motivated at least in part by such considerations in his
2007. Williamson wishes to reduce intuition to a disposition to enter into a doxastic state,
not directly to the doxastic state, but the motivation works in both cases. Richard G. Heck
Jr. (2000, 507–8) spells out this type of motivation for the case of perception.
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broadly logical concerns. It might be thought that a reductive account best
explains how intuition behaves, how we use it, and so forth.8
For all these reasons, then, one might be motivated to seek a reduction
of intuition or perception to a doxastic propositional attitude. But to which
one?
3 Different Doxastic Views
We can distinguish between different reductive views of intuition in sev-
eral ways. First, we can distinguish according to the contents of the re-
duced and the reducing states. The simplest view is that an intuition that
p is to be reduced to a doxastic state with the content p. Other views hold
that the reducing state must have a different content q, where q stands in
some appropriate relationship to p.
Secondly, we can distinguish according to which doxastic proposi-
tional attitude intuition is supposed to be reduced to. While one view
has outright belief as its reducing state, another claims that intuition can
be reduced to a degree of belief, a credence.9
Finally, some views hold that intuition should not be reduced to the
doxastic propositional attitude itself, but instead to the acquisition of atti-
8This motivation is operative in Earlenbaugh and Molyneux (2009). As is the case with
Williamson, these authors argue for a disposition view, but again, the motivation applies
in either case.
9On some usages, credences by definition obey the probability axioms. I do not use
the term in this way; it is to be regarded simply as a degree of belief.
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tude, or the disposition to be in it. We have, accordingly, at least the follow-
ing possible views. An intuition that p is reducible to:
1. A belief that p
2. An acquisition of a belief that p
3. A disposition to believe that p
4. Some credence in p
5. An acquisition of some credence in p
6. A disposition to have some credence in p
7. A belief that q
8. An acquisition of a belief that q
9. A disposition to believe that q
10. Some credence in q
11. An acquisition of some credence in q
12. A disposition to have some credence in q
Plausibly, there are even further variations: an intuition might be
thought to be the acquisition of a disposition to either believe or have cre-
dence in either p or q. But the list above captures the central contenders.
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In this paper I discuss all the above views, save the disposition views
(3, 6, 9 and 12). Such views merit separate treatment, which I cannot pro-
vide here. The views which are discussed in this paper I collectively label
‘doxastic’ views of intuition. I shall argue that a single line of argument
deals decisively with 1, 2, 4 and 5, and that, furthermore, this line can plau-
sibly be extended to deal with the remaining positions (7, 8, 10 and 11).
4 The Standard Case Against Doxastic Views
We begin with views of type 1. A simple view of this type is:
Equivalence: ∀x∀p(Ixp ↔ Bxp)
Equivalence says that all and only those who intuit that p believe that p.
It does not say that an intuition that p is identical to a belief that p, nor
that the words “intuition” and “belief” are synonymous with one another,
nor that the concept of having an intuition that p is the same as the con-
cept of believing that p. If any of these views are true, however, so too is
Equivalence, so its falsity establishes the falsity of all these views.10
And Equivalence clearly is false. There are many things I believe but
which I do not intuit. For example, I believe but do not intuit that pir2
yields the area of a circle, that (the northern) winter solstice is in December,
10Absent a reason to think that the properties of intuiting that p and believing that p
could be necessary coextensive but non-identical (a la that presented for having three sides
and having three angles in Sober 1982) one might think that the truth of Equivalence would
justify credence in the identity of belief and intuition. I do not pursue this here.
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and that if p, then ¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬p.
A natural next suggestion is that anyone who intuits that p believes
that p, but not vice versa. An intuition that p could then be taken to be a
particular type of belief that p. The suggestion is that an intuition that p is
reducible to the conjunction of a belief that p with the obtaining of some
other condition:
Ellipsis: ∀x∀p(Ixp ↔ Bxp & . . . )
Clearly there are ways to fill in the blank that render the view false. The
question is whether there are ways to fill it in that render it true. Until we
are told what is missing we cannot assess the view directly. But we can
assess it indirectly, via:
Entailment: ∀x∀p(Ixp → Bxp)
If Entailment is false, then Ellipsis is too, since the former is entailed by
the latter.
Agents sometimes come to regard something they intuit as false. This
is widely thought to show that such simple reductive views as Entailment
are false (Bealer 1992, 1996a,b, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2004; Chudnoff forthcom-
ing; Earlenbaugh and Molyneux 2009; Huemer 2001, 2005, 2007; Kagan
1989; Plantinga 1993; Pust 2000; Sosa 1996, 1998, 2006, 2007a; Williamson
2007). An often noted example is the Naïve Comprehension Axiom of set
theory:
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. . . I have an intuition—it still seems to me—that the naïve com-
prehension axiom of set theory is true; this is so despite the
fact that I do not believe that it is true (because I know of the
set-theoretical paradoxes) (Bealer 1998, 208).11
Call this ‘the standard case’ against doxastic views. To evaluate it, we need
to know whether the naïve comprehension axiom is an example of some-
thing we intuit but regard as false. We need to know whether we really
intuit the naïve comprehension axiom, and for that we need a formulation
of it. Bealer does not offer one. Moreover, on some common formulations,
it is questionable whether we do.12 However, I think it is clear that most
people have the following intuition:
NCA If anything which satisfies condition F satisfies condition G and vice
versa, then the set of the things which satisfy F is identical to the set
of things which satisfy G13
11The same formulation is found in Bealer 1992, 1996a and 1996b, and shorter refer-
ences to the same example are in his 2002 and Bealer (2004). In his 2001 he refers instead
to “the naïve truth schema” and the Liar Paradox to make the same point.
12For example: “For every predicate, there is a set of all and only the things to which
the predicate applies”, or “To every intelligible condition there corresponds a class: its
members (if any) are all and only the things that satisfy the condition” (Sainsbury 1987
[2003], 109).
13A useful paraphrase: If any F is a G, and any G is an F, then the set of the Fs just is
the set of the Gs. In what follows I restrict the discussion to NCA as stated. Anyone who
finds a different example more convincing—the conjunction of the premises in the Sorites
paradox, perhaps— should feel free to substitute accordingly. If it is felt that this is not
a formulation of the naïve comprehension axiom properly speaking, one should feel free
to regard ‘NCA’ as a mere label, not an acronym.
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NCA is false, for from it is derivable the claim that for any F there is a
set of all and only the things that satisfy F, and from this Russell’s paradox
follows.14 What makes NCA such a good candidate for a counterexample
to Entailment is precisely this fact, that it is provably false: learning of a
proof that demonstrates that a proposition is false seems very likely to
cause an agent to believe that it is.
Consider therefore an agent who has the intuition that NCA is true and
as a result acquires the belief that it is. She then learns or comes up with a
proof of its falsity. If NCA is to work as a counterexample to Entailment,
two things must be true of her:
i. She keeps the intuition that NCA is true
ii. She sheds the belief that NCA is true
A belief is shed if it is non-accidentally lost in an appropriate way. In this
instance it means that the agent loses her belief in NCA as a result of learn-
ing the proof that shows that NCA is false.15
Are i and ii true? The answer for i hinges in my view on consider-
ations about the agent’s phenomenology which are not at issue here. I
14 Assume NCA: ∀x∀F∀G[(Fx ↔ Gx) → {x : Fx} = {x : Gx}]. Substitute x /∈ x
for both F and G: ∀x[(x /∈ x ↔ x /∈ x) → {x : x /∈ x} = {x : x /∈ x}]. The antecedent
is a tautology. Deduce the consequent and perform existential introduction, using the
rule that anything which is self-identical exists. This yields ∃x(x = {x : x /∈ x}). Call
{x : x /∈ x} S. Is S a member of itself? Suppose it is. Then it must satisfy the condition
for membership in this set, which is to not be a member of itself: S ∈ S → S /∈ S.
Suppose it is not. Then it satisfies the condition for membership in S: S /∈ S → S ∈ S. So
S ∈ S ↔ S /∈ S. That is contradictory. So NCA is false.
15Further complications are probably necessary to avoid wayward ways of being the
result of, but here I assume that the story can be completed.
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think the answer is positive, and I shall assume this in what follows. But
what should we say about ii?
What is usually thought to show that Entailment is false is the fact that
agents sometimes come to believe that p is false (for instance by learning
the proof that it is) while still having the intuition that p. But this does
not yet constitute a counterexample to Entailment. Coming to believe that a
proposition is false is not the same as shedding a belief that it is true. A
defender of Entailment can therefore insist that the person who learns the
proof keeps her intuition—that is to say, her belief—that NCA is true, and
also acquires the additional and contradictory belief that NCA is false. She
believes both NCA and its negation.
The proponent of such a view could with some justification complain
that mere reference to NCA and similar cases does not suffice to show that
there really are cases of intuition without belief. We have been given no
argument for that conclusion, but merely been told to consider the cases
and come to agree. This is not quite the same as begging the question;
what needs to be shown has not been assumed. Those who take such cases
to demonstrate the falsity of the reductive view presumably rely on in-
trospection to ascertain that they do not believe NCA, and intend their
readers to do the same. But it is a clear weakness of the dialectical situa-
tion.
The proponent of the view under consideration would have to adopt
an error theory for certain self-ascriptions of mental states. Bealer says that
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he has the intuition that the naïve comprehension axiom is true “despite
the fact that I do not believe that it is true”. On the proposal under consid-
eration, he does believe that NCA is true. It is just that he also believes that
it is false.
Adopting an error theory always implies a theoretical cost, Here, how-
ever, the cost is small enough for the view to constitute a significant chal-
lenge. First, the cost is offset by significant motivation for adopting a
reductive view (§2). Secondly, not believing that p seems likely to be rel-
atively easily mistaken for believing that not-p.16 And finally, we know
that people—even sensible people—occasionally hold contradictory be-
liefs. Why could they not hold them in the relatively few cases of agents
regarding something they intuit as false?
Against this opponent, mere reference to NCA does not suffice. We
need a stronger case.
16Chudnoff (forthcoming) argues that we should not say about Bealer that he has a con-
scious inclination to believe NCA even though he professes not to. It is implausible, he
claims, that he would overlook a conscious inclination to believe that he actually has. I do
not find such oversights implausible, but in any case, the oversight under consideration
is smaller and even more plausible.
How would the account under consideration deal with cases where, after intuiting that
p an agent suspends judgement with respect to p? Such cases cannot be explained away
as a confusion of not believing that p vs. believing that not-p, since there is, ex hypothesi,
no belief that not-p in these cases. A proponent could either deny that that really are
any such cases—if the agent suspends belief with respect to p then she must have had
some antecedent credence that not-p—or simply accept the cost of attributing this error
(mistaken self-attribution of suspension of belief) to us in these rare cases, claiming that
the cost is outweighed by benefits (§2) of the view.
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5 The Argument from Rational Criticisability
We are, of course, in some sense free to use words to mean whatever we
want, and one could use ‘belief’ in such a way that the objections I shall
raise lose their bite. However, as Jackson (1998) reminds us, if we want to
have an audience we had better mean by our words what everybody else
means by them. In what follows I rely on a concept of belief which I take
to be that of sophisticated common sense (as it is by and large expressed in
recent philosophy of mind), and which I thus take to be a concept shared
by most of us.
A demonstration of the falsity of Entailment is then straightforward.
Agents who hold contradictory beliefs are usually ipso facto rationally crit-
icisable.17 There may be cognitive ‘positions’ one can be in relative to a
pair of contradictory propositions, such that if one is in one such position,
one is not rationally criticisable for believing these propositions.18 And
there may even be other factors or circumstances that shield one from ra-
tional criticisability. However, for NCA and its negation, one need be in
no such position, and no such circumstances need obtain. (If there are no
cognitive positions or other factors which shield one from rational crit-
icisability, so much the better for this argument.) Therefore, if intuition
17I make no claims about blameworthiness.
18Having a compartmentalized’ or ‘fragmented’ mind are both candidates, see Stal-
naker (1984, chapters 4 and 5), Lewis (1986, 30–9) and Lewis (1982). I am interested here
in the core idea, and not in the uses these authors put it to. In particular, it is intuitively
plausible that one can be shielded from criticisability for believing a pair of contradictory
propositions if each belief resides in a different fragment or compartment.
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implied belief, the agent who intuits NCA and believes ¬NCA would be
rationally criticisable. She is not. This shows that Entailment is false, and
so, too, is Ellipsis.
This simple argument is powerful. It relies on the notion of rational
criticisability, but that is not to its detriment. That notion has a better claim
than most others on being pre-theoretical, and the application it is put to
in the argument is on solid ground.
Regimenting the argument makes it apparent how innocuous the
premises are:
1. All who concurrently believe both a proposition and its negation are
either ipso facto rationally criticisable, or they are ‘shielded’ from crit-
icisability by being in special circumstances
2. Some people concurrently intuit NCA and believe ¬NCA
3. None of these are ipso facto rationally criticisable
4. Some of these are not ‘shielded’ by being in special circumstances
5. So, some of those who intuit NCA and believe ¬NCA do not believe
both a proposition and its negation
6. So, some of those who intuit NCA and believe ¬NCA do not believe
NCA
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7. So, it is not the case that whoever intuits a proposition believes that
proposition19
The premises here are all plausible. 1 is clearly true, and if we are lib-
eral about what counts as ‘special circumstances’, it is analytic. It presup-
poses that there be circumstances in which holding contradictory beliefs
renders one open to rational criticism, and that such circumstances are not
too rare. It is not clear how one can retain rational criticisability as a useful
concept and still deny this.
2 may be more contentious. The phenomenology associated with con-
sidering whether NCA is true is not completely unaffected by the acquisi-
tion of the belief that it is false. Some are tempted to say that the intuition
vanishes. That seems to be an overreaction; the changes are insufficient
for the intuition to be lost. Moreover, 2 only requires that not all those who
learn the proof lose the intuition as a result.
3 falls out of our ordinary understanding of rational criticisability. No-
19A formal version:
1. ∀x∀y[(Bxy & Bx¬y)→ (Sx ∨ RCx)]
For all x and y, if x believes y and its negation, then x is shielded or rationally
criticisable
2. ∃x(IxNCA & Bx¬NCA & ¬Sx & ¬RCx)
Some x intuits NCA, believes ¬NCA, and is neither shielded nor rationally
criticisable
3. ∃x[IxNCA & Bx¬NCA & ¬∃y(Bxy & Bx¬y)]
So, some x intuits NCA, believes ¬NCA, and believes no pair of a proposition
and its negation
4. ∃x(IxNCA & ¬BxNCA)
So, some x intuits NCA but does not believe it
5. ¬∀x∀y(Ixy → Bxy)
So it is not the case that anyone who intuits a proposition believes it
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one is ipso facto rationally criticisable for concurrently intuiting a proposi-
tion and believing its negation, just as no-one is ipso facto rationally criticis-
able for a halfway immersed oar looking bent to them while they believe
that it is not.
One might reasonably hold that a person who intuits that p but believes
not-p fails to be rationally ideal: perhaps the ideally rational person has no
false intuitions. But there is much distance between falling short of the
ideal with respect to rationality, on the one hand, and being rationally
criticisable, on the other. The judgement that an oar half-way immersed
in water would not look bent to the ideally rationally person seems to be
on equal footing with the corresponding judgement about intuition: there
is just as much (or as little) plausibility to saying that things look exactly
the way they are to an ideally rational person as there is to say that things
seem exactly the way they are to her. 3 is, I think, non-negotiable.
Note also that 3 is not threatened by the claim that one might be ipso
facto rationally criticisable simply for having the intuition that NCA is
true.20 That claim is false, I think, but even if true it would not show
that 3 is false. From an agent being ipso facto rationally criticisable for intu-
iting NCA it does not follow that she is ipso facto rationally criticisable for
intuiting-NCA-and-believing¬NCA.
We might say that being ipso facto rationally criticisable for is a non-
20See Sosa (2007b). Sosa only aims to show that an intuition is rationally criticisable
under certain conditions. To resist 3 on these grounds one would also need to show that
all cases of intuiting NCA while believing ¬NCA occur under these conditions.
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monotonic two-place relation. A two-place a relation is monotonic if, when-
ever two relata stand in the relation, then anything which entails the sec-
ond relatum also stands in that relation to the first relatum, and non-
monotonic otherwise. For example, being entailed by is a monotonic re-
lation, since if p is entailed by q, then p is also entailed by anything which
entails q (q&r, for example). By contrast, being provided strong inductive sup-
port by is non-monotonic, since it is not true that, if p is provided strong
inductive support by q, then p is also provided strong inductive support
by anything which entails q: p may not be provided any inductive support
by q&r, for example.
Being ipso facto rationally criticisable for is non-monotonic. I may be ipso
facto rationally criticisable for failing to listen to a local’s advice about a
hike in the mountains, but not for failing to listen while wearing a bowler
hat, even though the latter entails the former.21 I am rationally criticis-
able for failing to listen to the local while wearing a bowler hat, of course,
but not ipso facto rationally criticisable. My bowler hat just has nothing to
do with it. So even if an agent is ipso facto rationally criticisable for intu-
iting that p, it does not follow that she is ipso facto rationally criticisable
for intuiting-that-p-and-believing-that-not-p. So the fact that no-one is ipso
facto rationally criticisable for concurrently intuiting a proposition and be-
lieving its negation is not threatened by the possibility that one might be
21I might be rationally or aesthetically criticisable for going on a hike while wearing a
bowler hat. That is a separate issue.
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ipso facto rationally criticisable simply for having a particular intuition.
It should also be clear that, as 4 claims, some cases of intuiting that
NCA and believing that ¬NCA (and other similar cases) fail to occur in
circumstances that shield one from rational criticisability. There may be
cases where believing a pair of contradictory propositions does not render
one rationally criticisable because the contradictoriness is hard to discover.
This, however, is not one of them. It may be that even some believers of
obvious contradictions are not rationally criticisable.22 But whatever the
correct account of these latter cases turns out to be, it seems that some
notion of cognitive separation between the offending beliefs will play a
key role. Intuitively, to escape rational criticisability, the agent must be
barred from bringing them both under rational scrutiny together.
In our example there need be no cognitive separation of this kind, and
usually there is none. The intuition that NCA and the belief that ¬NCA
can easily be held firmly in mind at the same time; the mental ‘spotlight’
can shine on both at once; the town is big enough for the both of them. By
acquiring the belief that ¬NCA the intuition that NCA is not straightaway
relegated to another fragment or compartment.
One might instead be tempted to deny 4 by claiming that one cannot
help believing what one intuits. Ought implies can, so it cannot be that
agents ought to not believe NCA, and so they are not rationally criticisable.
But rational criticisability is not subject to ought-implies-can restric-
22See fn. 18 above.
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tions of this sort. A parent who has lost his child may not be able to
help believing that the child is still alive even though he knows full well
(and so believes) that the child is diseased. A person with a psychologi-
cal illness may not be able to help believing that her food is poisoned even
though she has compelling evidence to the contrary (and so believes that it
is not).If the parent’s and the patient’s minds are not compartmentalised—
and perhaps also if they are—then they are rationally criticisable for so be-
lieving, however psychologically impossible it may be to shed the beliefs.
Premise 4 is true.23
From these four premises it follows that Entailment is false; intuition
does not imply belief. And from this it follows that Ellipsis is false, too.24
It is worth emphasising that the argument from rational criticisability
differs sharply from the standard case. The standard case claims that cer-
23It is worth noting that the response in this paragraph is consistent with the admis-
sion that rational criticisability is subject to some ought-implies-can type restrictions. For
example, it is plausible that we are not rationally criticisable for failing to deduce all the
theorems of Peano arithmetic, and that this is at least partly because in some sense we
cannot. What the cases of the parent and the patient show, however, is that there is an
exception to ought-implies-can restrictions to rational criticisability when it is clear to the
agent what rationality requires. In the cases of complex theorems of Peano arithmetic,
what rationality requires is beyond our ken; we simply cannot tell. But in the cases of the
parent and the patient it is clear to the agent in question what is rationally required, she
is just in some sense unable to comply.
24An alternative approach would claim that on learning the proof, the agent does not
acquire the belief that NCA is false, rather she suspends belief, and believes neither NCA
nor its negation. However, it is very plausible that learning the proof will usually cause
the agent to believe ¬NCA. In any case, all the above argument requires is that some agent
concurrently intuits NCA and (for whatever reason) believes ¬NCA. So this alternative
strategy does not compete with the one presented here, at most it complements it.
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tain cases directly show that there is intuition without belief. It presents no
argument, but simply indicates the cases in question and relies on intro-
spection to support its view about them.
By contrast, I have argued that the hypothesis that intuition is reducible
to belief entails that agents would be rationally criticisable in certain situa-
tions. I have argued that we know this inter alia because, whatever the cir-
cumstances which ‘shield’ persons from rational criticisability are, exactly,
we know that the cases in question need not occur in such circumstances.
But we also know that the persons are not rationally criticisable in the sit-
uations in question. So we can conclude that the hypothesis that intuition
reduced to belief must be false.
That is the conclusion of the argument, not the starting point. I
have certainly not assumed that there are not contradictory belief in the
relevant cases. I have argued that there could not be, because the agent
would then be rationally criticisable, which we know she is not.
So far I we have considered views of type 1, which say an intuition
that p is reducible to a belief that p, together with the obtaining of some
other condition. But the argument just presented generalises immediately
to views of type 2, which say that it is reducible to the acquisition of a
belief that p.25 If an agent who believes that not-p intuits that p, and if she
25Views of this type were advanced by David Armstrong and George Pitcher for per-
ception.
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thereby acquired the belief that p, she would immediately thereafter come
to be in a position where she would be rationally criticisable. But we know
she does not. So intuition is also not reducible—wholly or in part—to the
acquisition of a belief that p.
6 Perception, Belief and Rational Criticisability
David Armstrong and George Pitcher developed in the sixties and seven-
ties views according to which perception is at least usually the acquisition
of belief:
[P]erception is nothing but the acquiring of true or false beliefs
concerning the current state of the organism’s body and envi-
ronment (Armstrong 1968, 209).
Sense perception is the acquiring of true beliefs concerning par-
ticular facts about one’s environment, by means of or by the use
of, one’s sense organs (Pitcher 1971, 65).
Known illusions constitute an obvious challenge for theories of this kind.
Attention to this problem will fortify the argument developed in the pre-
vious section.
A known illusion is a situation in which a part of the contents of per-
ception is falsidical, and known to be so. The case needs special attention
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from the perception-as-belief theorist, in particular in regards to the re-
lationship between the content of the perception and the content of the
ensuing belief. How can the content of perception be explained in terms
of the content of belief when we do not believe what we see? There is
pressure to divorce the content of perception from the content of belief, to
admit that a separate account of the content of perception is needed. The
situation is thus parallel in the relevant respects to the case of intuition
without belief.
It is instructive to ask why exactly there is a challenge for Armstrong and
Pitcher here. A well known case of known illusion is the Müller-Lyer fig-
ure, another useful example is looking at a wall known to be white through
glasses known to have blue lenses.26 Why does Armstrong not simply say
that the perceiver acquires the belief that the lines are of unequal length
while still believing that they are of equal length? Why does Pitcher not
claim that the perceiver believes that the wall is blue and that it is white?
More importantly, why should we not say this? The motivation to give re-
ductive theories of propositional attitudes aside from belief and desire is
strong (§2), and if we did, the content of perception could be accounted
for by the content of the acquired belief in the usual way.
The answer is that this account would then yield the verdict that sub-
jects are rationally criticisable in situations where we know they are not.
Whatever the circumstances in which subjects are not rationally criticis-
26The latter example is, to my knowledge, due to Jackson (1977, 39-49).
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able even when holding obviously contradictory beliefs, these are not
among them. So the subjects of the illusions do not acquire beliefs with
the content of their disbelieved perception.
It would be nice to give an account of rational criticisability which sys-
tematised these and other cases. I do not have a detailed account to of-
fer, nor is one needed to sustain the argument I offer here. But here is
a thought worth considering. Our epistemic states are ordered in a hi-
erarchy, with belief on the highest level. When states on the same level
contradict each other there is the potential for serious epistemic conflict.
When states on different levels contradict each other, ceteris paribus the
state which occupies a higher level will ‘trump’ the other. Rational criti-
cisability can only arise when a conflict between states on the same level
is not resolved by a state on a higher level (and may not arise in all such
cases). It does not arise when states of different levels are in tension. Clas-
sifying perception or intuition as belief brings about the mistaken predic-
tion of rational criticisability precisely for this reason. It misclassifies the
conflict, which is not between states on the same level (two beliefs) but be-
tween states at different levels (one belief and a perception or an intuition,
respectively), and therefore not a serious epistemic conflict.
Whether or not this strikes one as a plausible account, there is no need
to hold back from putting to its rightful use the observation that these
agents are not rationally criticisable. We can be confident that that is right.
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7 Credence
In response to known illusions both Armstrong and Pitcher develop their
accounts by saying that, perception should sometimes be identified with
a credence rather than an all-out belief.27 Thus Armstrong writes that in
some cases of known illusions,
we may still half-believe, or be inclined to believe, that [the
perceived object] is as it looks. . . . [A]n inclination to believe
. . . is nothing but a belief that is held in check by a stronger
belief (1968, 221).
And Pitcher writes that, when background beliefs causes an agent to be
“suspicious” of what she perceives; she “half-beliefs, or . . . is inclined . . . to
believe” it (1971, 91–92).
One might think that a parallel move could work for intuition. Does
anyone who intuits that p have a credence in p and vice versa? I first show
why this manoeuvre fails for the Armstrong/Pitcher line and then make
the parallel point for intuition.
27This is at least the most natural interpretation. Both Armstrong and Pitcher go on to
discuss a third and distinct set of cases, and argue that in those cses, perception is best
understood as a disposition to believe. Nothing here hinges on the question of interpre-
tation: the credence must be considered whether or not Armstrong and Pitcher held it. I
discuss the extension to cases of type 5 at the end of this section. Recall also fn. 9.
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The following two assumptions will be useful:
Correspondence (perception): If an instance of perception is to be identi-
fied with a credence, the credence must be high or very high when-
ever what is perceived is ordinary looking
No Change (perception): If an instance of perception is to be identified
with a credence, the credence does not change unless something
about how things look changes
Something fails to be ordinary looking when colours and shapes be-
have in very unusual ways, and is usually ordinary looking otherwise.
No restriction is placed on content per se, a perception of a pig flying could
be perfectly ordinary looking in the intended sense. Accounts that respect
the correspondence assumption are by far the most plausible. However, as
we shall see, the case against views on this type goes through even without
it.
Consider, then, an agent looking at a stick partially immersed in wa-
ter. If the agent in the past encountered similar situations, and if he has
in those situations run his hand along the stick and into the water, his cre-
dence that the stick is straight will be very high indeed. On the view under
consideration, we are supposed to identify the perceptual episode with a
credence. Given Correspondence (perception), that credence will also be
high: there is nothing extraordinary looking about a bent stick.
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But that means that, on the account under consideration, the agent
would have credences in two contradictory propositions adding up to sig-
nificantly more than one. On standard views of rational constraints on
credences he would then be rationally criticisable. But we know he is not.
So this response to the problem of known illusions fails.
We get this result even without Correspondence (perception), just so
long as the credence acquired is not very low. The credence that the stick
is straight is very high, and one is rationally criticisable as soon as the two
credences add up to more than one (whether or not it is significantly more
than one).
Another way to make the same point is this. Consider an agent who
encounters for the first time a stick half-way immersed in water, and
it looks bent to her. On the view under consideration, her perceptual
episode is to be identified with a credence that the stick is bent. So she
has some credence in that proposition, but also (let us assume) some
credence that the stick is straight. Now she runs her hand down along
the stick. It is incredible, surely, that her credence that the stick is straight
does not rise. But then the agent will either become rationally criticis-
able, or No Change (perception) will be violated. For running one’s hand
down a stick half-way immersed in water does not change how things look.
Turning now to intuition, the question is whether all and only those
who intuit that p have a credence in p:
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Equivalence (credence): ∀x∀p(Ixp ↔ Cxp)
As in the case of outright belief, it is easy to come up with cases of credence
without intuition.28 But perhaps intuiting that p implies having a credence
that p, and the obtaining of some other condition:
Ellipsis (credence): ∀x∀p(Ixp ↔ Cxp & . . . )
As before, we cannot assess Ellipsis (credence) directly. But we can
assess the following, which is implied by it:
Entailment (credence): ∀x∀p(Ixp → Cxp)
If Entailment (credence) is false, then Ellipsis (credence) is false too, since
the former is entailed by the latter.
28That there will be a second recession, that there is intelligent life on other planets, etc.
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Entailment (credence) fails in ways that are precisely analogous to
what we saw in the case of perception. To bring this out we make the
following assumption:
Correspondence (intuition): If an intuition is to be identified with a cre-
dence, the credence must be high or very high whenever the intu-
ition is strong
No Change (intuition): If an intuition is to be identified with a credence,
the credence does not change unless something about how things
seems changes
In the case of NCA, the intuition is strong, so the agent who intuits
that NCA would, given Correspondence (intuition) have high credence
in NCA. She also has high credence in ¬NCA, since she knows the proof.
She comes out as rationally criticisable, but we know that she is not. So
Entailment (credence) is false. Again, the argument goes through without
Correspondence (intuition), so long as the credence intuition is identified
with is higher than 1 minus the credence the agent has in ¬NCA.
We can make this point, also, in an alternative way. Consider an agent
who considers NCA for the first time, and it seems true to her. On the
view under consideration, her intuition is to be identified with a credence
in NCA. So she has some credence in that proposition, but also (let us
assume) some credence in its negation. Now she learns the proof of
Russell’s Paradox. It is incredible, surely, that her credence in ¬NCA does
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not rise. But then the agent will either become rationally criticisable, or
No Change (intuition) will be violated. For learning the proof does not
change how things seem, at least not significantly.
So far we have considered views of type 4, which say an intuition that p
is reducible to a credence that p, together with the obtaining of some other
condition. But the argument generalises to views of type 5, which say
that it is reducible to the acquisition of a credence that p. If an agent who
has a high credence that not-p intuits that p, and if she thereby acquires
a high credence that p (or, indeed, anything but a very low credence that
p), she would immediately come to be in a position where she would be
rationally criticisable. But we know she does not immediately come to be
in such a position. So intuition is not reducible—wholly or in part—to the
acquisition of a credence that p.
It is important to keep in mind the discussion of the non-monotonicity
of ipso facto rationally criticisable for, from §5 above. It is possible that there
are propositions r such that if I believe that r, I am ipso facto rationally
criticisable. But it does not follow from this that I am ipso facto rationally
criticisable for believing-that-r-and-intuiting-that-p, even though the latter
entails the former.
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8 Doxastic Attitudes with a Different Content
So far we have considered views which attempt to reduce an intuition that
p to a belief that p or a credence in p, or to the acquisition of such a belief
or credence. But what about views according to which intuition is to be
identified with a belief that q or a credence in q, or to the acquisition of
such a belief or credence? The arguments I have presented use the fact that
reductive accounts are committed to agents being rationally criticisable in
situations where we know that they are not. There is nothing blocking
the extension of this argument to the attempted reduction to a doxastic
attitude with a different content than the intuition itself.
Consider the proposal that an intuition that p is reducible to a belief
that q. Regardless of what we take q to be, one can intuit that p is while
believing that not-q without incurring rational criticisability. So such cases
fail, with complete generality.
Take, for instance, the suggestion that an intuition that p is reducible
to the belief I have some reason to believe that p. Suppose that I believe that
there are no such things as reasons, and deduce from this that there are no
reasons to believe that p, and further that, a fortiori, I have no such reason.
So I now believe: I have no reason to believe that p. It is quite clear that it is
compatible with this state of affairs that I nevertheless have the intuition
that p, and compatible without ipso facto rational criticisability.
If, however, my intuition that p was reducible to the belief I have some
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reason to believe that p, I would now be in the state of concurrently believ-
ing that I have some reason to believe that p and I have no reason to believe
that p. Whatever the circumstances in which subjects are not rationally
criticisable even when holding obviously contradictory beliefs, these are
not among them. So, if the reductive account were correct, I would be ra-
tionally criticisable. But we know that I would not, in fact, be rationally
criticisable in this situation. So the reductive account is incorrect.
It is important that I could really have the relevant belief, and not just
a belief I would express by saying “I have no reason to believe that p”. I
must actually have the belief that is correctly so expressed. And perhaps the
defender of the reductive account would be tempted to say that, contrary
to appearances, that is not a belief that I have. I have some other belief,
and express it badly.
I cannot see what could justify such a claim. As Williamson (2007)
urges, there is a big difference between having a concept, and fully master-
ing it. Presumably, all it takes for me to have the belief in question is that I
have the relevant concepts; it is not necessary that I master them. But why,
then, should I not be able to believe that not-q (or something that immedi-
ately implies not-q), for whatever q the reductionist wishes to use, and to do
so without incurring ipso facto rational criticisability for the combination
of that belief with my intuition?
It is an open question, of course, whether I can correctly believe that I
have no reason to believe that p as I intuit that p. Maybe intuiting that p
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always gives me a reason to believe that p (a reason that can be overridden,
of course). But that I cannot correctly believe that not-q is unfortunately
not a bar to my believing that not-q. If I can believe that not-q, then I can
come to be in a position in which the reductionist is committed to saying
that I am rationally criticisable. But we know I am not. Nomatter what the
belief q is, I am never ipso facto rationally criticisable for intuiting that p
and believing that q.29
9 The Significance of Rational Criticisability
Intuition cannot be reduced to belief or to degrees of belief. To show this
we recognise that no agent who concurrently intuits that p and believes
that not-p is ipso facto rationally criticisable. In arguments against the re-
duction of perception to belief or degrees of belief, rational criticisability
plays a precisely parallel role.
This is not an insignificant embellishment on an already strong argu-
ment. To see this, first note that, while the standard case against doxastic
views starts from the existence of cases of intuition without belief, the ar-
gument here presented has this as its conclusion. When what is at issue is
precisely the nature of intuition, the former line is dialectically ineffective.
Those who think that intuition is reducible to belief have little reason to
29The case against a reduction to the acquisition of a belief that q, to a credence in q and
to the acquisition of a credence that q runs precisely as one should expect, given what has
gone before.
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accept that the cases are as described.
There is a strong intuition that the agents in question would not be ipso
facto rationally criticisability for intuition that p and believing that not-p.
This intuition is not about the nature of intuition; it is about rationality. As
such it can better support a conclusion about the nature of intuition than
can the simple assertion that in the cases at hand there is no belief. From
this intuition, an argument leads to the conclusion that intuition cannot be
reduced to belief. Moreover, the argument withstands scrutiny and chal-
lenge, for instance from the view that the real explanation for the absence
of rational criticisability is that an intuition is a belief one cannot help but
having (reply: rational criticisability is not subject to such ought-implies-
can restrictions) and from the view that the criticisability is explainable by
the agent being critcisable for the intuition itself (reply: ipso facto rational
criticisability is non-monotonic).
Secondly, and far more importantly, the argument from rational criti-
cisability is revelatory of the nature of intuition in a way that goes beyond
the mere production of counterexamples.30 Rationality makes demands
on our doxastic attitudes, inter alia on their coherence.31 But there are no
30Compare Bratman (1987, 20).
31Some think that the only rational requirements are coherence requirements. It is plau-
sible, however, that there are also rational requirements for the adoption of doxastic at-
titudes on the basis of non-doxastic ones, e.g. the adoption of belief on the basis of per-
ceptual experience. It is plausible that I am rationally criticisable if I adopt the belief that
there is a banana in front of me on the basis of a visual perceptual experience as of a
tomato. For an experience must give me a reason to adopt the belief: “[E]xperience must
provide us with justifications for our beliefs about the world and not just ‘exclupations”’
Heck (2000, 500–1).
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coherence requirements between an experience and a doxastic attitude.
There is no belief such that a combination of that belief and an experi-
ence makes the agent ipso facto rationally criticisable. For instance, there
is no belief such that the combination of that belief and a stick half-way
immersed in water looking bent to an agent makes the agent ipso facto ra-
tionally criticisable. This shows that a reduction of a perception to a belief
that q is doomed, regardless of what q is.32 Similarly, there is no belief
such that a combination of that belief with an experience of fear makes
that agent ipso facto rationally criticisable. If I am afraid of the spider on
my leg, despite firmly believing that it is harmless, I am not ipso facto ra-
tionally criticisable. Any appearance to the contrary relies on a confusion
between the experience itself, and behavioural dispositions that often go
along with it. If I firmly believe that the spider is harmless, I probably am
rationally criticisable if I act in accordance with my experience of fear, es-
pecially if so acting implies a notable cost for me. But suppose that I have
rid myself of such dispositions. That makes it clear to see that I am not
rationally criticisable for the combination of my experience and the belief.
Experiences are simply the wrong kind of thing to bring this about.
I have argued that the argument from rational criticisability extends
32Incidentally, this argument is independent of whether perception has ‘naïve seman-
tics’ or ‘phenomenal’ semantics (Glüer 2009). I can just as much combine my experience
of a stick half-way immersed in water with the beliefs that nothing looks any way at all to
me, and so, a fortiori, that the stick does not look bent to me, as I can combine it with any
other belief, and without incurring ipso facto rational criticisability. It is a strange belief,
to be sure, and one would have to work at coming up with a scenario that would implant
such a belief in a person. But that does not change the basic facts of the case.
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to beliefs that q, for any q. If effect, then, I have argued that there is no
belief such that a combination of the belief with my intuition renders me
ipso facto rationally criticisable. But that is the characteristic I have just ar-
gued applies paradigmatically to experiences. So if that is right, it strongly
suggests that an intuition is an experience.
Far from being an insignificant embellishment on an already conclu-
sive argument, the rational criticisability argument tells us something im-
portant about both perception and intuition. It suggests a deep similarity
between perception and intuition, and something important about their
nature: perception and intuition are experiences.
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